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This paper presents a model and framework for pricing degree-day weather derivatives when the 
weather variable is a non-traded asset.  Using daily weather data from 1840-1996 it is shown that 
a degree-day weather index exhibits stable volatility and satisfies the random walk hypothesis.  
The paper compares the options prices from the recommended model and compares it to a 
typical insurance-type model.  The results show that the insurance model overprices the option 
value at-the-money and this may explain why the bid-ask spreads in the weather derivatives 
market is sometimes very large. 
 
 




An Options Pricing Model for Degree-day Weather Derivatives 
 
  The role of weather as a source of business risk has resulted in an emerging market for 
weather based insurance and derivative products.  In the U.S.A. companies such as World Wide 
Weather Insurance Inc., American Agrisurance Inc., Natsource Inc. (a New York City 
brokerage), Enron (a U.S. utility company), and SwissRe (a U.S. reinsurance companies) all 
offer weather risk products, such as swaps and/or options.  In the fall of 1999 the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange (CME) began trading in degree-day futures and options.  Applications are 
wide spread among the natural gas, oil, and electricity sectors, and more and more such products 
are being used for agricultural and other weather sensitive industries such as ski resorts and snow 
mobile manufacturing. The main attraction of weather derivatives is that it insures volume rather 
than price.  Too cool or too hot, too dry or too wet affects energy demand in utilities, production 
of crops and processing inventory in agriculture.  
  The types of contracts used to insure weather events are varied and include both swaps 
and options.  In terms of heat-based options there are two different types.  First, there are 
multiple event contracts.  A utility company may want to insure against a specific event such as 
daily high temperatures being below 5
oF for 3 days straight, and the contract might stipulate that 
up to 4 events would be insured over a 90 day period, or an agribusiness firm may want to insure 
against multiple events of the daily high temperature exceeding 90
oF for 4 days straight in order 
to compensate for yield and/or quality loss. 
  Second, are straight forward derivative products based upon such notions as cooling 
degree-days above 65
oF (an indication of electricity demand for air conditioning), heating 
degree-days below 65
oF (an indication of electricity, oil, and gas demand required for heating), 
and growing degree-days or crop heat units above 50 degrees Fahrenheit (an indication of 
maximum crop yield potential in agriculture).  These contracts are described as cooling degree-
day call (put) spreads or heating degree-day call (put) spreads.  The options contract (or ticket) 
has several sections including a general description of the product and the insured event; the 
specific weather location; the weather units being measured (e.g. degree-days or rainfall); the 
weather index being used (e.g. cooling, heating, or growing degree-days for the contract term); 
the contract term (e.g. June 1 to August 31); the index strike (e.g. 400 cooling degree-days); the 
unit price and currency (e.g. $5,000 per cooling degree-day); the settlement terms which indicate 




due to revisions from the weather authority; and the buyer’s premium
1.  Likewise, the CME has 
specified CDD and HDD futures contracts for each month of the year for 20 cities across the 
U.S.A.  Thinly traded, the futures contracts are based on cumulative degree-days within the 
month, and settlement is based on readings supplied by Earth Satellite Corporation.  The 
Notional value of the futures contract is equal to $100 times the CDD or HDD index value.  
CME degree-day options on CDD and HDD futures are listed in units of degrees Fahrenheit.   
One of the problems facing the weather derivatives markets is how these derivatives 
should be priced. In the absence of a tradeable contract in weather and equilibrium price cannot 
be established using conventional means (Dischel 1998). At one end of the pricing spectrum, 
Cao and Wei (2000) develop a pricing model based on expected utility maximization with an 
equilibrium developed from   Lucas’s (1978) model.  Davis (2001) also concludes that a Black-
Scholes type framework is not appropriate for pricing weather derivatives as a matter of course, 
but under the assumptions of  Brownian motion, expected utility maximization, a drift rate that 
includes the natural growth rate of the degree day measure, the natural growth rate in the spot 
price of a commodity (e.g. fuel price) and the natural growth rate in firm profits, then degree day 
options can be priced by a Black-Scholes analogue.  Considine (undated) provides some simpler 
formulas based on the historical probability distribution of weather outcomes as well as a 
gaussian (normality) model that he claims can be sufficient at times. Turvey (2001) presents a 
number of flexible rainfall and heat related option contracts based upon historical probabilities. 
There are empirical issues related to weather derivatives and a large part of this paper is 
dedicated toward resolving these issues in general, and the pricing of degree-day options in 
particular.  First, until the CME started trading weather futures there was no forward market for 
weather.  Individuals speculate on what a heat index might be 90 days hence, but unlike stock 
market indexes there is no mechanism for transparent price discovery on which to base such a 
prediction, and nature is under no obligation to comply with subjective market assessments.  
Second, rain or heat or any other insurable condition does not have a tangible form that is easily 
described (in contrast with common stock or a commodity futures contract).  Third, for cities in 
                                                 
1 To insure against excessive heat, World Wide Weather uses the following wording “The Company will insure 
from July 1, 1999 through August 31, 1999 that the temperature will not be 100 degrees Fahrenheit or above at the 
National Weather Service Station located in Santa Barbara, California”.  For growing degree-days “The Company 
will insure from April 1, 1999 to May 31, 1999 that there will be 1000 or more GDDs at the National Weather 
Service Station located in Fresno, California.  Everyday where the average temperature is X degrees over 50 degrees 




the U.S.A. and elsewhere that are not listed on the CME, there does not exist a forward market 
weather index that would allow brokers, traders, and insurers to price such derivatives on an 
ongoing and transparent basis.  This can impact liquidity in the OTC and insurance markets and 
can also have an impact on the appropriate market price of risk with which to price the contract.  
Fourth, the mechanics of brokering weather contracts depends specifically on the nature of the 
contract.  A common approach is to use historical data and from this use traditional insurance 
‘burn-rate’ methods to determine actuarial probabilities of outcomes.  This convention limits 
trade.  For the most part counterparties must agree on a price prior to the opening contract date 
and are in general restricted by lack of data to efficiently price and trade the contract during the 
period in which it is active.   
  For pricing put and call options on cumulative weather outcomes a limiting factor is in 
the transparency of a forward weather index. A forward weather index such as the HDD and 
CDD futures at the CME would operate like any other index and would be used to provide a 
current estimate of what the final weather index settlement would be.  In so doing it would 
provide a mechanism  for counterparties to trade on a continuous basis, and would also provide a 
mechanism for the continual pricing of the options’ intrinsic values. 
This paper develops an option pricing model based on such an index even if it is not 
traded.  However, unless the index is formally traded, deriving option values from it will require 
consideration of the natural diffusion rate and the market price of risk as per lemma 4 in Cox, 
Ingersoll and Ross (1988).  This paper discusses the properties of such an index, shows the 
evolution of the index in a dynamic context, and develops an options pricing model. 
The theoretical development of an option pricing model for cumulative degree-day call 
and put spreads is the focus of this paper.  The next section briefly establishes the economic 
motivation for weather derivatives.  This is followed by an explanation of the insurance-type 
model and then the pricing of options in a dynamic framework is presented. The theoretical 
model is then applied to the pricing of  degree-day derivatives for Toronto, using daily mean 








The Economics of Weather in the Profit Maximizing Firm 
  The purpose of this section is to provide some economic intuition behind the role of 
weather and its effects on firm profits.  In a classical economic context the profits of the firm can 
be defined by 
(1)  Π  (P, Q(W), C(W),t) = P(Q) Q(W) - C(Q(W)) 
where P is the output price as a function of Quantity, Q; Q represents a quantity of sales or total 
productivity and it is a function of the weather variable; and the cost function C( ) is an 
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In equation (2) ∂ Q/∂ W can be viewed as the marginal productivity of weather and being industry 
specific it can take on values that are negative, positive, or zero.  
  Equation (2) indicates three not mutually exclusive impacts on firm profitability.  The 
first part on the right hand side of equation (2) is the direct price effect.  The direct price effect is 
a consequence of changes in supply or demand in the market place due to weather impacts.  It 
can be positive or negative.  Sustained drought conditions in agriculture will at least affect prices 
in localized markets, if not national or international markets.  We have seen, for example, crop 
failures in Eastern Europe lead to dramatic increases in local and international wheat prices.  In 
other cases mild winters in the northern hemisphere will lead to excess supply and price 
reductions in vacation spots at winter holiday destinations.  Energy wholesalers can see dramatic 
increases or decreases in prices depending on weather driven demand impacts. 
  The second component is the increase or reduction in quantity produced or sold.  For the 
farmer facing localized drought conditions profit losses will result from decreased yields.  For 
the ski resort the number of lift tickets sold will be an increasing function of snowfall.  
  The third component is the impact on costs.  In some industries the cost effect is subtle.  
Reseeding, fertilizing or herbicide spraying will often result from extreme weather events in 
agriculture.  In the energy sector peak load pricing resulting from excess demand in extreme heat 
or cold conditions is a significant cost borne by the municipal utility.  In many regulated 
electrical energy markets any price increase to be transferred to consumers is regulated so that 




  The common element across examples is that the weather impact is transmitted to firm 
profitability through the quantity variable.  The uncommon element is the precise functional 
form of Q(W).  In energy markets it will be a convex function with quantity affects rising at 
weather extremes due to excess demand.  In agriculture the Q(W) function is likely concave with 
crop losses occurring at either extremes of weather conditions.  Still, other industries will exhibit 
strictly increasing, or strictly decreasing functions of weather.  In fact, it is the heterogeneity of 
weather impacts across firms and industries that has given rise to a market for weather-risk 
derivative products including swaps and options. 
  It is this heterogeneity that has also given rise to a market based on specific weather 
events rather than firm cashflow.  Since by equation (2) different firms are impacted differently it 
is impractical to even attempt to insure cashflow directly.  Instead, firms engaged in trade in the 
weather derivatives market will attempt to hedge cashflow risks by adjusting the notional value 
or hedge position in specific-event weather derivatives.  To gain some intuition as to why this 
market evolved, consider the expected value of equation (1) at which some point in time T is 
given by 
(3) E[Π (P, Q(W), C(Q),T) = ∫ [P(Q) Q(W) - C(W)] g(W)dW. 
Where g(W) is the probability distribution function associated with the specific weather event.  
Define Wz as the certainty equivalent value of a weather index, below which profits will fall and 
above which profits will rise.  Then  
(4) E[Π ( )] = ∫
WzΠ  (W) g(W)dW + ∫ WzΠ  (W) g(W)dW. 
The first part of equation (4) gives the expected value of losses below Wz and the second gives 
the expected value of gains.  If the firm wants to insure losses below Π (Wz) then it could buy a 
cashflow-based insurance contract with a value 
(5) V(Wz) = ∫
Wz (Π (Wz) - Π (W)) g(W)dz. 
However, such a contract would be difficult to price in practice because the cashflows will not 
generally be observable.  Furthermore, such a contract implies a specific business to business 
transaction, and as indicated by the discussion around equation (2), heterogeneous weather 
impacts suggests that each weather affected firm will need to negotiate a separate contract.  This 
comes with substantial transactions costs. 
  To avoid these transactions costs capital markets are designing a set of homogenous 




outcomes rather than firm-specific cashflow.  These include swaps and options.  In this market it 
is the affected firm that defines its weather risk and the quantity of standardized weather 
contracts to be bought (or sold).  From equation (5), at some point in time T, we can equate the 
value of losses due to weather events to a number of specific-event weather derivative products, 
i.e. 
(6)  ∫
Wz (Π (Wz) - Π (W)) g(W)dW = ￿￿∫
Wz (Wz-W) g(W)dW 
or 
(7) V(Wz) = ∆ V
*(Wz) 
Equation (6) sets the expected value of cashflow losses equal to the expected payoff from a 
weather option.  The (put) option value is measured by the right hand side in equation (6) and is 
denoted as V*(Wz) in equation (7).  The expected value of the option at time T is given by Max 
E[Wz - W, 0].  The intrinsic value of the weather index is multiplied by θ  which has units 
converting the value of W to $/W (for example $100/cooling degree-day).  The value ∆  
represents the number of contracts required to insure the certainty equivalent value of profits, 
that is ∆  = V(Wz) / V
* (Wz). 
  While the economics guiding the advent of the weather derivatives market is rational the 
problem of pricing weather derivatives remains unresolved.  In the next section a common 
insurance type solution - referred to as the 'burn-rate' model or insurance model is presented and 
then a general solution to the problem along the lines of modern options pricing is presented. 
  
The Pricing of Weather Options 
  This section describes a pricing methodology for weather derivatives. First, a ‘burn rate’ 
method employed by many brokers and insurers is described. Second,  based on the assumption 
that a forward degree-day weather index exists for any location a general proof that such 
contracts can be priced using a formula similar to Black’s formula for pricing European options 
on futures contracts is presented; third, a simple approach to creating a forward weather index is 
provided; fourth, the underlying assumptions of volatility and a random walk in a weather index 






The ‘Burn Rate’  Method for  Pricing Weather Derivatives 
In the absence of a forward weather index the pricing of weather derivatives is relatively 
straightforward.  Using historical data cumulative degree-days (heating days, cooling days or 
crop heat units) are calculated for the time period in question and the options are priced as 
(8) ]} 0 , [ {
∗ − − = T
pT
p W Z Max E e V   
for a put option, and  
(9) ]} 0 , [ { Z W Max E e V T
pT
c − =
∗ −   
for a call option where p is the appropriate risk adjusted discounted rate, T is time or duration of 
contract in years, Z is the strike level in degree-days, and W
*
T is the value of the index at 
expiration also measured in degree-days. Since V measures the expected value of  in-the-money 
degree-days, the actual price of the option is calculated by multiplying  V by a  dollar value with 
units $/degree-day.  In equations (8) and (9)  it is assumed that the payoff is $1/ degree-day. The 
probabilities that establish V are assumed to be stationary priors drawn from historical weather 
patterns and can be defined as either discrete or continuous.   
The conventional methodology used in the industry is the ‘burn rate’ model which uses 
discrete observations of the n=1, N sampling distribution.  That is, for a put option, 













where each in-the-money observation is given equal weight. The  burn-rate approach draws from 
statistical inference over time, which assumes that history will repeat itself with the same 
likelihood as the past events described by the data used. In the alternative a long enough time 
series could be used to fit a known continuous probability distribution (e.g. a normal distribution) 
and the put option price could be obtained from 
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where L is a lower bound to the distribution. 
If a continuous probability distribution is used there is an underlying assumption that the 
data series used is sufficient to fully describe the limiting probability distribution of outcomes 
with all asymptotic properties intact. Whether the probabilities of specific weather events are 
described by discrete or continuous distributions it should be noted that the measure of variance 




be representative of the current year’s (intra-year) risk, and as will be shown later, what is 
assumed about the underlying stochastic structure is a critical element in distinguishing between 
the burn-rate model and modern options pricing. 
 
Weather Indices, Futures Hedging, and Options Pricing 
  The burn-rate models will typically be purchased prior to the insured period, and will be 
traded infrequently, if at all.  The reason that such contracts will not be traded results from the 
fact that there is no transparent mechanism to update or revise the probabilities during the 
insured period and hence no opportunity to arbitrage risk. The opportunity to arbitrage requires 
liquidity and liquidity requires observable volatility in an expected weather index W
*
T.  IF WT is 
the value of a degree-day weather index at expiration then for any t<T there must exist an 
expectation about WT, that is W
*
T = E[WT|t], conditional on weather information up to and 
including time t.  Observable volatility in W
*
t requires  first the existence of a forward weather 
index, and secondly that it be defined by an inter-temporal stochastic process. 
  The continuous time stochastic differential equation for the weather index can be 
described by Brownian motion and the Ito process 
 (12)  t t t t dZ W dt W dW
∗ ∗ ∗ + = σ µ  
The stochastic process described by (12) describes a random walk and is fundamental to the 
design of new derivative products for entities that follow a Markov process.  As shown by 
Merton (1993), Black and Scholes (1973), Black (1976) and others, if the underlying 
assumptions in (12) hold then it can be used to price options.  In Equation (12) µ  is the mean 
change in cumulative degree-days and σ  is the variance of the daily change in degree-days.  The 
assumptions, which are empirically tested in this paper, are that the diffusion rate µ  is constant 
over time and σ
2 increases linearly in time. 
    
Equilibrium Pricing Formulas for Degree-Day Derivatives 
  With the introduction of the CME degree-day future contracts there will be, at least for 
specific locations, a spanning asset for which a classical options pricing formula can be derived.  
However, there are more jurisdictions without contracts than with, and this implies that not all 
risks can be spanned and risk-neutral valuation techniques cannot readily be used without 




options on non traded assets. In particular, an options pricing model when the underlying asset 
cannot be spanned by traded assets requires including the market price of risk. This has lead 
some practitioners to declare that modern options theory in the form of Black (1976) or Black-
Scholes  (1973) will not work (Nelken 1999, Dischel 1998) for pricing weather derivatives. 
  To capture the market price of risk, equation (12) is represented by 
(13) dW
*
t = (µ  - λσ ) W
*
t dt + σ W
*
t dZ 
where λ  represents the market value of risk, and λσ  the risk premium.  Equation (13) is not 
consistent with Black-Scholes, but is consistent with the risk-neutral solution of Cox and Ross.  
The market price of risk as an economic entity results from Lemma 4 in Cox, Ingersoll and Ross 
and ensures that in equilibrium the rate of return on the option equals the risk-free rate in 
equilibrium.  Therefore the term (µ -λσ ) is called the risk-neutral growth rate and it can be used 
to derive equilibrium prices of options on non-traded assets. 
  To price these options we modify the dynamic programming approach presented in Dixit 
and Pyndick.  The Bellman equation is  
(14)  F(W,t) = E [F(W,t) + dF(W,t)]e
-pt 
where F(w,t) is the value of the option, and p is the appropriate (risk adjusted) discount rate.  
Using equation (5) suppressing the 
* in W
*, and applying Ito’s lemma 
(15)  dF(W,t) = (1/2 F"w σ
2 W
2 + F'w (µ -λσ ) W + F't) dt + F'w σ  Wdz 
 Setting  e
-pt = (1-pdt), substituting dF(W,t) into equation (14), and solving yields the 
stochastic differential equation. 
(16)  ½ F"w σ
2W
2 + F'w (µ -λσ ) W + F't = pF. 
  Equation (16) is a common-form partial differential equation.  The call option value of 
F(W, X, t) that solves this equation for a strike price X=Wz is 
(17)  C(W,t) = F(W,t) = θ  [e
-pt N (d1) X - e
-(P- (µ -λσ ))t N(d2) W] 
where t is time remaining until option enquiry, θ  is the value per tick, X is the strike price in 
degree-days, p is the discount rate, N( ) is the value of the standard normal cumulative 
distribution function evaluated at d1 or d2, 
d1 = [ln (W/X) + (µ  - λσ  + .5σ
2)t]/σ√ t 
and 




Since the market price of risk is explicitly included in the solution, the appropriate discount rate 
'p' for a risk-neutral valuation is the risk free rate, r.  However this still leaves unresolved the 
problem of determining the market price of risk λ .  In a more general framework the diffusion  
µ  - λσ  = r is called the risk neutral growth rate (Cox and Ross, 1976) and is a necessary 
condition for equilibrium pricing.  In contrast µ  is viewed as the natural growth rate in the value 
of the underlying.  The value λ  = (µ -r)/σ  is then the market price of risk. 
  If the market price of risk so defined is applied to freely traded assets then p = r = µ -λσ  
can be substituted into equation (17) and the resulting formula is identical to Black-Scholes.  A 
more general argument is required for assets that are not-traded.  For this we appeal to the 
security market line of the capital asset pricing model where 
µ  = r + β  [rm - r] 
or 
(18)  µ  - r = β  [rm - r]. 
Then we can define the market price of risk λ  as 
(19)  λ  = β  [rm - r]/σ  
so that in equation (17), d1 becomes 
(20)   d1 = [ln (W/X) + (µ  - β  [rm - r] + .5σ
2)t}/σ√ t. 
To use equation (20) we need to interpret the Sharpe-Lintner model in the broadest sense. Roll's 
critique of the CAPM reminds us that the basic theory of pricing assets in equilibrium does not 
only apply to traded assets but non-traded assets as well.  With this, the true market portfolio is 
unobservable and broad based indices such as the S&P500 used to proxy the true market 
portfolio return may be biased.  Nonetheless, the theory provides for the equilibrium pricing of 
capital assets so that (20) must hold in (theoretical) equilibrium.  In fact Stambaugh's follow-up 
to Roll indicates that inferences about the CAPM model are consistent with theory even when 
assets are not traded. 
  As indicated above, equation (21) is a general solution to pricing all assets in equilibrium.  
For the particular case of weather derivatives its form becomes simplified.  If the underlying is a 
futures contract such as those traded on the CME, then we can use Dusak's argument that since 
the number of long positions equal the number of short positions then the outstanding value of 




Consequently the β  coefficient for all futures contracts is zero.  Furthermore, we know from 
Black that to avoid riskless arbitrage the growth rate in the futures contract must equal the risk 
free rate. 
  For futures contracts on weather variables (20) becomes 
(21) d1 [ln (W/X) + (r + .5σ
2)t]/σ√ t 
and (17) becomes the standard Black-Scholes pricing model with p=r.  Using W(t) = e
-rt W(T) 
and substituting this into (17) gives Black's model for pricing options on futures. 
  When the weather index is not a traded variable we rely on the direct relationship 
between the non-traded weather index and the market portfolio.  Since the impact of weather 
events in localized regions will not be correlated with the market portfolio, then it to will have a 
beta of zero. This is consistent with the empirical findings in Cao and Wei (2000). The result and 
conclusion does not imply that the conditional  underlying risks of economic outputs are zero, 
butthat in equilibrium the source of the risk can be diversified away.   However, unlike a futures 
contract the non-traded weather variable will not grow at the risk-free rate.  In fact the spot value 




T].  This implies a 
natural tendency towards mean reversion so E[µ ]=0.  By substituting β =0 and µ =0 into equation 
(17) and setting p=r to account for risk neutral valuations, the pricing model for call option on a 
non-traded weather index is given by  
(22) C(W,t)  =  θ e
-rt [N(d1)X-N(d2)W] 
where 
d1 = [ln (W/X) + .5σ
2t]/σ√ t 
 and 
 d 2 = d1 - σ√ t 
As a reminder the parameter θ  is the tick value measured in $/degree and the bracketed term is 
measured in degrees.  The equivalent put option value is 
(23) P(W,t)  =  θ e
-rt [N (-d2)W - N(-d1)X] 
The solution value of the option pricing models rests on three assumptions that are 
evaluated in the empirical section.  Assumption 1 is that the natural dynamics of dW originates 
from a random walk and hence unanticipated changes in W are not serially correlated.  If strong 
and predictable autocorrelation is present then asymmetric information between buyers and 




strong evidence that W* evolves as a random walk that is consistent with geometric Brownian 
motion. 
  The second assumption is that volatility is non-stochastic.  If volatility evolves in an 
unpredictable way then equation (15) is misspecified and a more complex solution would be 
required.  Hence the third assumption is that σ  = E[σ (t)] in equation (15) which means that 
volatility is set equal to the mean from a sample of measured volatility.  I will show later that 
volatility is stable within and between years.  This assumption is consistent with the assumption 
of time dependence in Merton (1993) and Wilmott (1998). 
  The fourth assumption is that E[µ ]=0 in equation (15).  This assumption simply states 
that W
*
O = E[WT] and investors in weather options will use the mean of the historical sampling 
distribution as an unbiased estimate of the initial condition for dW.  This is exactly how the 
opening prices of the CME exchange traded degree-day future prices are set.  A less naïve 
condition is that W
*
O = E[WT|Ω ] where the expectation is now based on the conditional mean 
based on the information set Ω  at time t=0.  This is relevant when counterparties believe that 
degree-days will be higher or lower than the historical average.  This may or may not come about 
as a variance preserving shift.  However, I will provide evidence that the volatility of the degree-
day index is remarkably stable even with large swings in the historical value of the indices and 
will also show how differing expectations affect option prices. 
 
Defining a Weather Index 
  In the previous section the existence of a forward weather index was presumed. While 
possibility rather than existence is sufficient to support the development of an option pricing 
model, it is obviously a limitation to implementation and practice. The CME futures contracts 
will satisfy the spanning requirement of a correlated underlying derivative security, but CME 
contracts do not exist for many regions or cities.  Hence the foregoing is a generalized solution 
that can be used to price options even if a formal futures contract does not exist.  In this section a 
general approach to constructing a weather index using historical data is presented. In the next 
section the index model will be applied to a case study of degree-day contracts for Toronto. 
  The challenge for any broker or exchange to accurately price weather options is in the 
construction of an appropriate weather index which can be observed on a daily basis, and provide 




unique characteristic that the weather index cannot be influenced by human speculation. In this 
context the index is observable, objective, and representatively transparent.   For example, 
settlement of the CME contracts is based exclusively on the data collected by Earth Satellite 
Corporation.  Furthermore, a consistent characteristic of weather is that it is seasonal and 
systematic; summer, for example, always starts of with low temperatures that rise to a peak, and 
then decreases towards autumn. A naïve hedger planning a hedge in early spring would naturally 
assume that the summer weather pattern would follow the average pattern as dictated by history. 
Critical to this is the additional assumption that temperature is mean reverting: In the absence of 
any contrary information it is not unreasonable to assume that if the average temperature on June 
30
th is 70 degrees Fahrenheit, then in the current year the best unbiased estimate is that it will 
also be 70 degrees. The notion of mean reversion is also a natural phenomenon; the tendencies 
for temperature to fall to within a normal range following a heat wave, or to rise to normal 
temperatures following a cold snap is clearly the norm rather than the exception. 
  The absence of predictability and the assumption of mean reversion suggest that the best 
initial (t=0) unbiased estimate of the forward index is the historical average of the index over the 
specified contract time horizon.  Indeed the opening trade on the CME futures contracts will 
most likely be the long-run average cumulative degree-day with some adjustment for long-term 
forecasts or revised expectations.  The initial index value is given by equation (18): 
(24) 
*
0 W=  E [ W T] = 
T
0 t=Σ  E[Wt]  
where W represents the weather index (e.g. cooling degree-days, heating degree-days, growing 
degree-days or cumulative rainfall). After 1 day the observed weather condition at t=0 is 




 1 = W0  + 
T
1 t=Σ  E[Wt] . 
Similarly at t=2  
(26) W
*
 2 = W0  + W1 + 
T
2 t=Σ E[Wt] ,  





t=0 Wt  + 
T




As the index evolves with time the instantaneous percentage change in the weather index can be 
calculated as  







and daily volatility is  
(29)  σ
2 = E[µ  - E[µ ]]
2. 
Finally, under the assumption of mean reversion the path described by 
T
0 t=Σ E[Wt] needs to be 
estimated. This can be done by using historical data directly but since this has to be recalculated 
for each day in the contracts life it is computationally intense.  In the alternative,  
T
0 t=Σ E[Wt] can 
be estimated from a simple regression equation to get the same result. In this study the estimated 
equation describing the evolution of temperatures during the summer months was quadratic.  
 
 
The Pricing of Cooling Degree-Day Options 
  
  In this section option premia are calculated for Toronto Ontario using Environment 
Canada daily mean temperatures from 1840 to 1996.  The contracts examine summer cooling 
degree-day call (put) spreads.  With this option the buyer agrees to pay a fixed premium in  
exchange for payment from the seller if the defined Weather Index settles above (below) the 
Index Strike for the Contract Term. The payment equals the number of Weather Units the 
Weather Index falls above (below) the Index Strike times the Unit Price. There may be a payout 
limit but this is not considered in this study. 
 First the temperature history from June 1 through August 31 is described from a 
historical perspective. As history will always be the source of weather patterns it is important to 
understand how more recent trends compare to past trends.  
Second, using a cooling degree-day measure of heat above 65 degrees Fahrenheit, 
degree-days are calculated for each day and cumulative degree-days are calculated for each year.  
Third, a quadratic regression equation is estimated with mean daily degree-days as the 
dependent variable and time and time squared (within the contract term) as the independent 




Fourth, using mean cumulative cooling degree-days as the initial index value, observed 
daily degree-days, and the regression equation, the forward index value for each day, in each 
year was calculated. 
Fifth, using the daily forward index values, the empirical volatility of the index is 
calculated from the variance of the daily percentage change in index values. This is done for 
each year. 
Sixth, assuming a discount rate of 6.5%, the historical mean volatility, 92 days to 
expiration, and a strike price (which is varied), call and put option premiums are calculated. As a 
point of comparison premiums using the ‘burn rate’ approach are also calculated. 
 
Toronto’s Weather History 
  This section describes the weather history from June 1 to August 31 for the years 1840-
1996 in Toronto. The data used were obtained from Environment Canada and represents one of 
the longest available weather data series in Canada. Figure 1 plots the data. The plot shows an 
overall increase in mean daily temperature over this time period, with temperatures increasing at 
an increasing rate until approximately 1930 and then increasing at a decreasing rate. Since  
Approximately 1950 there does not appear to be a significant rise in mean daily temperatures.  
  Figure 2 shows the cumulative cooling degree-days in Toronto between 1840 and 1996. 
The cooling degree-days increase with the mean temperature as would be expected, but the graph 
also illustrates the variability and unpredictability of the measure. The graph shows that cooling 
degree-days increased at an increasing rate throughout most of the 19
th century but appear to be 
quite stable or decreasing in terms of mean value towards the end of the 20
th century.  Table 1 
summarizes the key statistics for the entire 1840-1996 period and the sub period from 1930 to 
1996.  From 1840 the average cooling degree-days ranged from 107 to 787 with a mean of 379 
and a standard deviation of 147. The period since 1930 has cooling degree-days ranging from 
186 to 787 with a higher mean of 489 and a standard deviation of 114.  
Figure 3 illustrates the mean actual and predicted daily degree-days within the 92-day 
period from June 1 to August 31. The pattern is parabolic and the statistical fit (using a quadratic 
equation) of predicted to average was approximately 93% (R-squared)
2. Figure 4 illustrates the 
                                                 
2 With daily temperatures about 65
oF as the dependent variable the equation is Temp = -.38 + .21T - .002T
2 where T 




cumulative degree-day effect throughout the time period. The degree-day value used in options 
pricing is the total sum recorded on the 92
nd day. 
 
Calculating the Cooling Degree-Day Weather Index 
  This section describes how the CDD weather index was calculated.  The index was 
calculated for each year in order to assess the range of CDDs and to measure volatility.  The 
cooling degree-day weather index was generated from a combination of observed daily data in 
each year, the seasonal regression equation, and the average cumulative degree-day value across 
all years. The initial index value at t=0 is assumed equal to the average cumulative degree-day 
value.  This is identical to the sum of the marginal degree-days illustrated in figure 3.  The 
smooth parabola in figure 3 illustrates how the regression equation smoothes the variability in 
daily degree-day measures and acts as an unbiased predictor of the most likely temperature path 
based on the assumption that weather patterns are mean reverting. To calculate the index the 
degree-day above 65f is calculated from the first observation (day 1). Then the sum of the 
predicted daily degree-days is calculated along the parabola from day 2 through to day 92. 
Assuming that the day one degree-day measure is small this will provide a day 1 index value 
very close to the long run average. On day 2, the actual degree-day measure is taken and is added 
to the day 1 value. The sum of the predicted is then taken from day 3 to day 92 and added to the 
actual day 1 plus day 2 values (see equation 17). The procedure is repeated for each of the 92 
days (see equation 18), and is repeated for each year in the sample.   
  Figure 5 illustrates the results for three recent years in Toronto; 1986 was an average year 
with cooling degree-days of 386. The summer started of quite cool and this caused the index to 
fall below the average until about day 55 where a warming trend caused a slight increase in the 
value of the index; 1988 was a hot year and the index was above average throughout the season. 
A short cooling spell from day 31 to about day 40 caused the index to decrease but beyond that 
cooling degree-days were significantly higher than average. The 1988 index peaked at 
approximately 750 on day 80, but a cooling trend caused the index to fall to 725 by day 92; In 
contrast to 1986 and 1988, 1992 was unusually cool with cumulative degree-days of 186 by day 
92. The index was average for the first 3 weeks of June, but after that a long cooling trend caused 






  Volatility is measured relative to the percentage change in the value of the index on a 
daily basis and then converted to an annualized (365 day) basis for convenience. Table 2 and 
Figure 6 show the estimated average volatility for Toronto cooling degree-days from 1840 to 
1996 and from 1930 to 1996. 
  The results indicate that the weather has actually been less variable since 1930 than in the 
previous 90 years. From 1840 to 1996 annualized volatility was .2063 or 20% per year, but this 
decreased to .1739 or 17% per year in the mid to latter part of the 20th century. For the entire 
period the minimum volatility was found to be 16.62% with a maximum of 29.61%, while the 
latter part of the century the range was as low as 14.14% but only went as high as 23.5%. 
Combined with the information in Table 1, weather averages in Toronto saw an increase in mean 
summer temperatures and degree-days, but this increase did not come with increased variability. 
In fact, the standard deviation of cumulative degree-days (Table 1) is lower for the 1930-1996 
period than the 1840-1996 period. Importantly, these observations signify that when options on 
weather are being priced it is important to match recent weather trends on index values and 
volatility. In the next section, which calculates option premia, an approach, which mitigates this 
problem, is discussed. 
 
Volatility Stability 
  Use of the options pricing model requires stability in the index's volatility within a given 
year and across years.  The first item is important because if daily volatility is a function of time 
or is characterized by discernable jumps the proposed pricing model will be misspecified.  The 
second is important because stability in volatility across years means that the sample volatility 
can be used as an unbiased estimate of volatility. 
  Volatility stability was measured by calculating the percentage daily change in the 
weather index in each year (91 days), i.e. In [WT/Wt-1].  To determine the stability of volatility 
rolling 30-day standard deviations of the percentage change were calculated and annualized to a 
365 day year.  Thus for 91 days used in this study there were 61 volatility estimates for each 
year.  Table 4 shows the results from this evaluation over the 1840-1996 period and two 




The annualized volatilities have been stable across years, with the average 30 day 
volatility being about 20%.  This compares to the average volatility over the whole 91 days of 
.2063 as shown in Table 2.  The results also show that the standard deviations are low relative to 
the mean.  For example a standard deviation of .023 for 1840-1996 indicates that the average 30 
day volatilities ranged from .178 to .223 approximately 67% of the time.  The within year 
coefficient of variation (mean/standard deviation) reveals that the means are 6.42, 5.98 and 7.13 
times the within-year 30-day standard deviations for each of the periods.  These numbers imply 
that not only is volatility stable across years but they are quite stable within each year as well. 
 
The Variance Ratio Test for Random Walks 
  The pricing of weather derivatives requires that the weather index W
*
T evolves over time 
as a random walk described by geometric Brownian Motion.  Failure to support the random walk 
hypothesis would vitiate the model structure.  In addition, the model assumes that the volatility 
of W
*
T is fairly stable.  Failure to show stability in volatility would require expanding the model 
to include a volatility diffusion or jump process. 
  A general test for a random walk as presented by Lo and MacKinlay (1999) is the 
variance ratio test.  Under the normal definition of a diffusion process the expectations are that 
the mean diffusion rate is constant and volatility is linear in time.  Hence the mean return on an 
asset with two time steps will be twice that for a single time step and likewise the variance of the 
two time step will be double that of a single time step.  These conditions can be stated as 
follows
3 
a) E[Wt+1 - Wt] = µ 1 
b) E[Wt+k - Wt] = kµ 1 
c) VAR[Wt+1 - Wt] = σ 1
2 




                                                 
3 If levels data are used the conditions apply to arithmetic Brownian motion, and if In(Wt) is used they apply to 
geometric Brownian motion.  The tests in this paper use the logarithmic conversion, but I do not change the notation 




where k represents the number of time steps, µ k represents the mean of a k-step (or k day) 
diffusion, and σ
2
k represents the variance of a k-step diffusion.  This property allows for a simple 









Lo and MacKinlay (1999) provide a measure of the asymptotic variance for the variance ratio.  If  













z ) 1 ( 3
) 1 )( 1 2 ( 2 2
−
− −
= σ  
is the asymptotic variance of z when overlapping lags of length k are drawn from N 
observations.  Thus the null hypothesis can be tested against the standardized normal z test with 
mean and variance σ
2
z.  For example, if z<1.96 in equation (30) we would fail to reject the null 
hypothesis at the 5% level if (31) was used as the asymptotic population variance.  In the 
alternatively one could also use an F-Test for the differences in variances when the means are 
equal.  In this case the numerator is  k k k / ˆ
2 2 σ σ =  so that the ratio  ) 1 , ( ~ / ˆ 1
2 − − N k N F k σ σ .  The 
null hypothesis would be rejected if the ratio fell outside the two-tailed range of the F-
distribution over a specified acceptance region. 
 
Seasonality and the Variance Ratio Test 
  One of the concerns about pricing weather derivatives is the influence of seasonality on 
the random outcomes.  Autocorrelation brought about by seasonal weather patterns can lead to 
rejections of hypothesis using the variance ratio test even if autocorrelation is spurious as is 
found in heat waves and so on. 
  The impact of systematic seasonal influences cannot be ignored but the effects can be 
removed.  Removing systematic weather patterns leaves a path dependent residual that resembles 
a random walk.  To see this define the daily temperature path above 65
oF as a function of time as 
g(t).  In the current study for example, g(t) = a+bt-ct
2 is a quadratic which fits nicely the summer 




from daily data across many years non-systematic weather events are removed and captured by 
the residuals. 
Given the definition of g(t), the expected value of cumulative cooling degree-days at time 
t=0 is  





0 ∫ =  
After day 1 the actual degree-day is calculated and its deviation from expected is recorded.  At 
the end of day 1 
(33)  dt t g e g W
T
) ( ) 1 (
2 1
*
1 ∫ + + =  
and at the end of day 2 
(34)  dt t g e e dt t g W
T
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This can be generalized to any data t<T as 
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  One can see from this process that the random part follows a walk over each time step, 
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t-k] = ket 
as required for a random walk. 
  However, while this process is consistent with a random walk, the existence of a random 
walk must still be treated as a hypothesis.  Recall that the function g(t) removed non-systematic 
weather events such as heat waves or other extraordinary items that could cause year specific 
transitory autocorrelation. 
  Transitory autocorrelation can be removed by averaging across years, but to do this the 
definition of the variance ratio must be modified accordingly.  From the above results the mean 




  For a variety of reasons the value of et will not necessarily equal et, n-1 or et, n+1 so across 
N years the expected value of ket is 







where the subscript n has been added to denote the year of the observation. 
  The variance of equation (39) is given by 
(40)  σ
2
k   = E[ke1 - E[ke1]]
2 
  =   E   [ k e 1 - kµ 1]
2 
  =   k








This measure of σ
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1 in that the step multiplier k 
is squared.  This results from averaging the mean lags from each year.  However, since 
seasonality and spurious autocorrelation have been removed the variance measure is unbiased 
and asymptotically efficient and the variance ratio is 


















k - 1 = 0 
 
Long-Run Versus Short-Run Effects 
  Having resolved problems of seasonality and asynchronous autocorrelation a final 
question to consider is whether the random walk hypothesis holds across a smaller number of 
years.  Rather than averaging across the entire history of weather records (e.g. 1840-1996) a 
useful examination would be to examine shorter (e.g. overlapping 30-year) time horizons.  The 
benefits to doing this are to first determine if acceptance or rejection of a random walk is due to 
long versus short time horizons, and second to examine the persistence or frequency of the 
random walk over time.  Each 30-year sample can be considered an unbiased estimate of the 
larger population, but the asymptotic population variance is known.  Therefore the standard 
errors can easily be estimated. 
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and this can be used in the denominator of a t-statistic with n-1 degrees of freedom. 
 
Variance Ratio Test Results 
  The variance ratio hypothesis was tested using daily data from 1840-1996 for 92 days in 
each year. The tests were conducted by first calculating the value W
*
t,n for each day and across 
years, and then converting this data to logarithms.  The results are presented in Table 4 for all 
years and 5 subperiods for lags of 1-10 days and lags of 35-40 days. 
According to theory a random walk would be rejected if the means of the k-lag difference 
or the variance of the k-lag difference are significantly different than the values of k in the first 
column.  Using N=92 in the calculation of the asymptotic variance in equation (31) and 
calculating the test statistic Z in equation (30) there are no instances where the random walk is 
rejected.  Using N=92 the F-test fails to reject the null hypothesis that the variance ratio is 
significantly different than 1.0 in all case. 
  Failure to reject the null hypothesis on the variance ratio occurs even though there is a 
visible departure in the computed value of k in Table 3 from the theoretical value of k.  The 
reason for this is that the asymptotic variance increases with k.  For example when k=2 the 





1 in the 1840-1870 subperiod is 8.27 points above the theoretical value of 40, the 





1 - 1)/σ z is equal to 1.20 which falls below the critical 
value of 1.96 at the 5% level. 
  To examine whether the results in Table 4 are a consequence of chance or sampling the 
variance ratios were also calculated for overlapping 30 year periods and the null hypothesis was 
tested using the t-statistic which accounts for possible sampling error.  The standard error is 
defined in equation (37) which divides the Lo and Mackinlay asymptotic variance measure by 
the square root of 30 (years).  Of 128 overlapping time periods in no case was the null hypothesis 
rejected at the 5% level for up to 29 lags, and only 1 violation beyond that.   Repeating the 
analysis for 20 and 10-day lags revealed that at 20 lags there were 29 rejections for an 





  The results offer strong support for the random walk hypothesis even when a small 
number of years are considered.  But in this result also resides the caveate that to truly smooth 
individual year effects at least 30 years should be considered in practice.  Notwithstanding this 
assertion there is sufficient evidence to conclude that indeed the index of cooling degree-days 
follows a random walk about the seasonal trend.  Failure to reject the random walk also implies 
that volatility jumps are probably not of great concern.  This does not imply volatility is a 
constant value, but it does imply that an average value of volatility across years, E[σ ] is an 
unbiased estimate of volatility.  Furthermore given the evidence in Table 3 the estimate E[σ ] will 
be consistent and efficient.  The evidence suggests that the option pricing model proposal in this 
paper is appropriate for the pricing of degree-day weather options. 
 
Estimates of Cooling Degree-Day Option Premia 
 
  This section reports actual option premiums calculated for Toronto, Ontario. The 
contracts considered are 92-day put and call options with contract terms from June 1 with an 
expiry on August 31.  Each tick in-the-money (θ ) was valued at $5,000 per degree-day. Several 
empirical considerations are illustrated in the results. First, premium estimates are calculated 
using the both the inter-year ‘burn-rate’ method used in the insurance industry (equations 8 and 
9) and the intra-year Black’s option pricing model (equations 22 and 23). Second, in order to 
illustrate the importance of ‘relevant time horizon’, estimates are provided for the 1840-1996 
data period and the 1930 to 1996 sub-period. Third, the options pricing model is sensitive to the 
initial index value, W
*
0, and using a simple average in all cases would not be prudent. For the 
options pricing model only, a range of initial values of W
*
0 are examined. This type of sensitivity 
analysis is important because weather agencies such as Environment Canada and the U.S. 
Weather Service cannot generally predict forward temperatures with reasonable accuracy. 
However, they can and do provide three or four-month forecasts that state whether conditions are 
going to be normal, below normal, or above normal. If the prediction is above normal, for 
example, the buyer of a call may want to increase the initial expectation of W
*
T to match the 
forecast and reduce the premium. 
Tables 5 for 1840-1996 and 6 for 1930-1996 present results for base case at-the-money 
option pricing calculations as well as a range of strike prices above and below this value. The at-




379.39 for 1840-1996 and 489.50 for 1930-1996. The option premiums differ between the 
options model and the burn rate model as well as across the two time periods. When the 
sampling period was represented from 1840 the at-the-money put and call price was $77,073 for 
the 379-CDD strike option model and approximately $297,030 for the burn rate model (Table 5). 
The maximum payoff for the put option under either case would have been $1,361,450 for the 
put option and $2,038,150 for the call option.  As the strike price was increased put options 
would be issued in-the-money and the put option premiums would rise as the call premiums fell. 
For a strike of 600 CDD the option model put premium was $1,085,126 while the burn-rate 
model was $1,136,421. The maximum put payoff increased to $2,464,500. The corresponding 
call option for the option model was $0 and for the burn-rate model it was $33,405. The 
maximum payoff that would have possibly occurred with this strike over this period was 
$935,100.  A lower than average strike implies that put options are issued out-of-the-money, 
while call options are issued in-the-money. At a strike of 250 CDD the put options price is 
negligible, while the call option price is $636,438. Using the burn-rate model the corresponding 
put and call prices were $63,947 and $710,420 with maximum payoffs being $714,500 for the 
puts and $2,685,100 for the calls. 
  A similar pattern was observed for the 1930-1996 period (Table 6). The at-the-money 
option price (489.5 CDD) for the put and call was $83,835 and using the burn-rate model the 
put-call price was approximately $220,358. The maximum put and call payoffs would have been 
$1,516,900 and $1,487,600 respectively.  For in-the-money calls with a strike of 250 CDD the 
call option was  $1,178,041 and the corresponding put was $0. The burn-rate put and call prices 
were $4,767 and $1,202,279 respectively, with maximum payoffs of $319,400 and $2,685,100. 
For in-the-money puts at 600 CDD the put option price was $544,298 and the call price was only 
$776. The burn-rate premiums were $624,900 and $72,412 for the put and call respectively. 
  These results illustrate some important and critical details regarding the pricing of 
degree-day derivatives and the selection of a time period over which to analyze heat. The 
difference between options pricing and burn-rate models is striking, especially when priced at-
the-money. Using the 1840-1996 period the burn-rate model prices the insurance at 3.85 times 
the option pricing model whereas the 1930-1996 period the pricing multiple is 2.63. The ratio 




results illustrate why different approaches to pricing weather options can result in large bid-ask 
spreads. 
  The explanation for these differences lies in how risk is measured and what risks are 
actually being traded. The burn rate model assumes that history will repeat itself and the 
variability and probability distribution of the past will be replicated in the future. It rests upon an 
actuarial structure, which is seemingly predictable, but one, which also carries with it some 
significant variability. In contrast the options pricing model is not backward looking in the sense 
of a memorized historical probability distribution. It assumes an infinite of random weather 
patterns, which can occur in any season. The role of history is vague only in its use to establish 
seasonal norms and a range of volatility measures, but once these are established history’s role is 
done. 
  Another key difference is the assumption of a starting point. The options pricing model 
assumes a numerical starting position from which variability in a weather index is measured, and 
the price of the option is sensitive to this initial position. For example the further the index strike 
is below the initial index value the higher will be the value of a call option and lower will be the 
value of a put option. Because the burn-rate model’s principal Gaussian assumption is that 
history will repeat itself, the burn-rate model does not require an estimate of the initial weather 
index value perse.  
 
  As discussed above the initial assumption regarding the forward weather index is crucial 
to the accurate pricing of options. Tables 5 and 6 present results assuming that the initial index 
value is equal to the historical mean. In reality this may not be the case. Weather forecasts may 
predict higher or lower than normal temperatures and this will have a conditional impact on what 
the initial index value is. For example mean growing degree-days for the 1930-1996 period was 
489.5 with a range from 186 to 787 and a standard deviation of 114 (Table 1). If the long-range 
weather forecast was for warmer than usual weather, then it would be prudent to increase the 
initial index value accordingly so that the likelihood that a put option would end in-the-money is 
lower and the likelihood that the call would end in-the-money is higher. Likewise, if the long-
range forecast was for cooler than normal weather then the index would be decreased such that 
the likelihood of a put ending in-the-money would increase and the likelihood of a call ending in-




  Table 7 presents option pricing sensitivity results for the 1840-1996 period and Table 8 
presents results for the 1930-1996 period. Since the burn-rate model does not rely on initial 
conditions only the option pricing model is considered. Each column in Tables 7 and 8 represent 
a percentage of the mean with 1.0 representing the mean, .50 being 50% of the mean and 150% 
being 50% higher than the mean. As predicted by options theory as the initial condition 
decreases the put option value increases and the call option value increases holding the strike 
level constant. For example if the strike level is 400 CDD the values in Table 7 for the 1840-
1996 period for a put option is $1,034,468 and call price is $0 if the weather forecast implies that 
cumulative degree-days will be 50% less than average. If the cooling trend is believed to be less 
severe, say 75%, then the put value for a 400 CDD strike decreases to $507,929 and the call 
price is $23. If the weather prediction calls for a 50% increase in cooling degree-days then the 
likelihood that a 400 CDD put option will expire in-the-money is nil, and the put option is priced 
at $21.  In contrast, the likelihood that the call option expires in-the-money rises and the call 
option premium increases to $831,708. A similar pattern is illustrated for the 1930-1996 period 
in Table 8. 
 
Conclusions 
  This paper addressed the pricing issue of degree-day weather derivatives. The market for 
weather insurance products has increased dramatically in past years for several reasons. First 
weather derivatives are directed at hedging production or volume versus price risk. In the natural 
gas and energy sectors, utilities will often fix prices to the consumer or face regulated prices to 
consumers. Electrical utilities must of ten pay peak-load prices when energy demand exceeds 
contracted supplies, and natural gas and oil companies must pay higher spot prices when extreme 
cold causes excess demand in those markets. Agriculture is also an industry that faces weather 
related production risk. A crop insurer might have to pay increased indemnities if weather is 
either too hot or too cool, and might use weather derivatives as a reinsurance product, or a food 
processor might require a hedge against undeliverable forward contracts resulting from weather 
conditions. 
  An important driver of the weather derivatives market is the relationship between 
economic damage and specific events. Electrical utilities know with 100% certainty that 




products, and they can also determine statistically at what level, in cumulative heating or cooling 
degree-days, this occurs. What is unknown is when the specific event will occur and with this 
uncertainty routine hedging of weather risks can provide economic stability and increase share 
values. 
  This paper examined the pricing methods of degree-day derivatives. It was shown that 
many of the underlying assumptions used in modern options pricing are relevant to weather 
conditions. The critical, and justifiable, assumption is that weather risks follow a Martingale, and 
based on this assumption the stochastic differential equation which drives weather dynamics 
follows an Ito process. It was shown that applying arbitrage free arguments to this stochastic 
process results in a pricing formula similar, but not identical to Black’s formula for pricing 
European options on futures. The key difference between the pricing model developed in this 
paper is that price per degree-day is held constant while the quantity variable (degree-days) 
varies, whereas the original Black’s model holds quantity constant (e.g. 1 bushel) while allowing 
price to vary. Another difference is that Black’s (1976) model is derived from trading in an 
underlying futures contract which is subject to many supply and demand influences which create 
volatility and liquidity whereas the weather option relies on a non-traded forward weather index. 
An approach to defining such an index was discussed at length in this paper. 
  The approach used in this paper differs markedly from an insurance approach to pricing 
weather derivatives. The ‘burn-rate’ approach, prices premiums based upon what would have 
occurred over a recent time period. It was pointed out that the key difference between the burn-
rate model and the options pricing model is in how risk is defined. Under the burn-rate model it 
is assumed that history will repeat itself with the same likelihood, but not necessarily the same 
order, as the time horizon selected for pricing. In other words, the approach assumes that the 
relevant measure of risk is the inter-year variability in weather. The options pricing model 
developed in this study makes no such assumption and is in fact based on intra-year risks. As 
with conventional options pricing, volatility and the initial value of the weather index are the key 
drivers of risk. History is used only to measure volatility and determine a range of index values, 
but once a measure of volatility is selected and the initial condition determined, history has no 
further role to play in the pricing process. For example the 1840 to 1996 period had mean 
cooling degree-days (above 65f) of 379 CDD and an annualized volatility of 20.63% for the 




489 CDD with a volatility of 17.39%. Under no year was volatility found to exceed 29.6%, yet 
the implied volatility that would equate the options pricing model to the burn rate model was 
80% for the 1840-1996 period and 45.8% for the 1933 to 1996 period.  
  It was shown that there is a significant and often large difference between the burn-rate 
model and the options pricing model, particularly for products priced at or near-the-money. It 
was shown that the burn rate model prices options as much as 2 to 3 times higher than the 
options pricing model. The two approaches converge only for options that are priced in the 
money or out of the money.  It is consistent with the various theories of pricing non-traded assets 
in equilibrium, and in a risk-neutral economy.  Statistical analyses confirmed that the underlying 
assumptions required for pricing degree-day weather options are empirically valid. 
  The options pricing model presented in this paper is new. On one hand it is an 
improvement over the traditional burn-rate approach in that it places much more emphasis on 
risk and for a derivatives market which is essentially designed to manage the buying and selling 
of risk there can be efficiency and liquidity gains if the model is implemented in practice. On the 
other hand the traditional approach is easy to implement and even easier to comprehend. 
However, if a formal derivatives market for weather insurance is going to emerge it is very likely 






Table 1: Historical Summary of Toronto Cooling Degree-Days 
 
  Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
1840-1996  379.39 146.67 107.10 787.02 






Table 2: Historical Summary of Toronto Cooling Degree-Days’ Volatility 
 
  Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
1840-1996  .2063 .0012 .1662 .2961 








Table 3:  Seasonality and Stability in Volatility 
      
 1840-1996  1840-1936  1936-1996 
Mean (365 days)  .201  .207  .193 
Standard Deviation  .023  .022  .021 
Coefficient of Variation Mean  6.42  5.98  7.13 







Table 4:  Estimated Value of Means and Variance Ratios (VR)* 
 
  1840-1996 1840-1870 1871-1900 1901-1930 1931-1960 1961-1996 
Lag  K  Mean VR Mean VR Mean VR Mean VR Mean VR Mean VR 
1  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00  1.0 
2  1.99 2.01 2.00 2.01 2.01 2.00 2.00 2.01 2.01  2.03*  2.01 2.00 
3  2.99 3.02 3.00 3.03 3.03 3.01 3.01 3.02 3.02  3.08*  3.04 3.01 
4  3.99 4.04 4.00 4.06 4.06 4.03 4.00 4.04 4.03 4.14 4.07 4.02 
5  4.98 5.06 5.00 5.09 5.09 5.07 4.95 5.06 5.03 5.23 5.11 5.03 
6  5.97 6.09 6.00 6.14 6.14 6.11 5.87 6.09 6.03 6.32 6.15 6.05 
7  6.96 7.13 7.00 7.21 7.18 7.16 6.79 7.12 7.05 7.41 7.18 7.10 
8  7.95 8.17 8.01 8.30 8.22 8.21 7.71 8.17 8.08 8.52 8.20 8.19 
9  8.95 9.23 9.02 9.40 9.26 9.26 8.65 9.23 9.12 9.65 9.22 9.22 
10  9.97  10.30 10.03 10.54 10.32 10.32  9.62  10.29 10.18 10.80 10.23 10.24 
             
35  35.47 31.05 36.07 42.07 38.99 40.99 30.39 38.50 37.27 41.56 37.74 40.85 
36  36.47 40.22 37.11 43.28 40.22 42.27 31.31 39.67 38.35 42.75 39.01 42.03 
37  37.46 41.58 38.14 44.50 41.44 43.56 32.23 40.82 39.41 43.91 40.28 43.20 
38  38.47 42.55 39.16 45.75 42.69 44.86 33.12 41.94 40.47 45.06 41.54 44.38 
39  39.47 43.73 40.16 47.02 43.95 46.15 34.01 43.18 41.51 46.23 42.79 45.57 
40  40.48 44.90  41.5  48.27 45.20 47.46 34.95 44.37 42.56 47.41 44.02. 46.77 













Table 5: European Options and Burn Rate Premiums: 1840-1996, Tick = $5,000 
 Option  Value Burn  Rate Maximum  Payoff 
  Put Call Put Call Put Call 
200  0  882,374 18,215 915,190  464,500  2,935,100 
250  0  636,438 63,647 710,420  714,500  2,685,100 
300  692  391,264 135,264 533,239 964,500  2,435,100 
350 23,156  167,718  229,910  376,885  1,214,500  2,185,100 
379.39 77,073 77,073  297,054  1,361,450  2,038,150  2,038,150 
400 139,950  38,574  352,121  249,096  1,464,500  1,935,100 
450  351,674 4,361 508,943  155,918  1,714,500  1,685,100 
489.50 542,100  497  657,13 106,788  1,912,000  1,487,600 
500 539,513 263 698,560  95,534  1,964,500  1,435,100 
550 839,198  10  908,806  55,781  2,214,500  1,185,100 
600  1,085,126 0 1,136,421  33,405  2,464,500  935,100 






Table 6: European Options and Burn Rate Premiums: 1930-1996, Tick = $5,000 
 Option Burn  Rate Maximum  Payoff 
 Put  Call  Put  Call  Put  Call 
200 0  1,423,978  1,035  1,448,548  69,400  2,935,100 
250 0  1,178,041  4,767  1,202,279  319,400  2,685,100 
300 0  932,103  8,498  956,010  569,400  2,435,100 
350 2.52  686,168  20,119  717,631  819,400  2,185,100 
379.39 94 541,697  841,749 39,261  2,319,400  685,100 
400 670  440,897  50,519  498,031  1,069,400  1,935,100 
450 17,974  212,266 121,639 319,150  1,319,400  1,685,100 
489.5 83,835 83,835  220,358  220,370 1,516,900  1,487,600 
500 113,047  61,400  249,622 197,134  1,569,400  1,435,100 
550 306,996 9,411  417,813 115,325  1,819,400  1,185,100 
600 544,298  776  624,900  72,412 2,069,400  935,100 






Table 7: Sensitivity of Options Prices to Initial Conditions, 1840-1996 
  .50 .75 1.0 1.25  1.50 
Strike  Put Call Put Call Put Call Put Call Put Call 
200  69,975  19,287 10  415,853 0 882,375 0  1,348,906  0  1,815,437 
250  296,757  132 6,873  176,779 1 636,438 0  1,102,968  0  1,569,499 
300  542,563 0 104,962  28,931  692  391,192 0 857,031 0  1,323,562 
350  788,500 0 323,336  1,367  23,156  167,718  100  611,193 0  1,077,624 
400  1,034,468 0  567,929 23 139,950  38,574  4,644  369,800 21 831,708 
450  1,280,375  0 813,844 0 351,674  4,361  46,048  165,266  1,039  586,788 
500  1,526,313 0 1,059,781 0  593,513 263 174,937  48,218  13,747  353,559 
550  1,772,250 0 1,305,719 0  839,198 10 381,556  8,900  72,838  166,712 
600  2,018,188 0 1,551,656 0 1,085,126 0  619,676  1,081  209,925  57,861 











Table 8: Sensitivity of Options Prices to Initial Conditions, 1930-1996 
  .50 .75 1.0  1.25  1.50 
Strike  Put Call Put Call Put Call Put Call Put Call 
200 335  220,449 0 822,046 0  1,423,978  0  2,025,910  0  2,627,842 
250  56,523  30,700  0 576,109 0  1,178,041  0  1,779,973  0  2,381,904 
300  272,149 388  502 330,673  0  932,103  0 1,534,035 0 2,135,967 
350 517,699  0  28,254  112,488 2.52 686,168  0  1,288,098  0  1,890,030 
400  763,636 0 175,874  14,170  670  440,897 0  1,042,160  0  1,644,092 
450 1,009,573  0  408,223  582  17,974 212,266  12  796,234  0  1,398,155 
500  1,255,510  0 653,588 9 113,047  61,400  837  551,122 0  1,152,217 
550  1,501,448  0 899,516 0 306,996  9,411  13,374  317,721  33  906,313 
600  1,747,386 0 1,145,454 0  544,298 776 77,173  135,584  1,004  661,346 







































































Figure 1:Mean Seasonal Temperature, Toronto, June 1 to August 31 





































































Figure 2:Mean Actual and Predicted Daily Degree-Days, Toronto, June 1 
























































































Figure 3:Mean Daily Cooling Degree-days, actual and predicted, Toronto, 





































































































Figure 4:Cumulative Cooling Degree-days, Actual and Predicted, 






























































































Expected  1986 1988 1992
Figure 5: Cooling Degree-Day Weather Indexes for 1986 (average), 1988 
(above average) and 1992 (below average), Toronto, June 1 to August 31 




















































Figure 6:Mean Annualized (365 day) Volatility, Toronto, June 1 to August 
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